Dr hab. Dominik Mierzejewski, Associate Professor at the University of Lodz, Head of the Centre for Asian Affairs
In this context, we asked Prof. Dominik Mierzejewski, Head of the University of Lodz Centre for Asian Affairs, who specialises in the rhetoric of Chinese diplomacy, about the country’s foreign policy in regional terms and the political and economic development of contemporary China, for an analysis. We publish it below (subheadings come from the editorial office).
The failure of Putin's "special operation" is a problem for China.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin shook hands on 4 February 2022, it seemed that the alliance of the two giants would redefine the international system. In this context, the parties erroneously predicted that the United States was a declining power and that Washington's days were numbered.
Russia's attack on Ukraine may have raised eyebrows in Beijing, but the parties – trusting each other – hoped that the "special operation" would efficiently resolve the annexation of Ukrainian territory. Then, after the triumphant parade, Putin would receive congratulations from Beijing, and thus, the entire West would be taught a lesson. In such a context, a military option regarding Taiwan and the ensuing "great revival of the Chinese nation" – a slogan promoted by the current governing team in Beijing – would be possible. However, things have turned out differently.
Throughout the year, Chinese diplomacy has not officially presented its position. However, it would be naive to expect that China will directly support the Russian Federation or, on the other hand, Ukraine, and the West. Strategic Chinese culture is based on ambiguity and extensive context, which is part of the "Chinese DNA". Just look at the literature of the old masters, including Sun Zi or "Thirty-Six Stratagems". There are no direct solutions always a roundabout way of doing things. But that's not all. Additionally, in my opinion, there is one important detail. This is an internal arrangement made in the Chinese leadership.
Why Xi Jinping must support Putin
For this reason, the present authorities in China are politically closer to the Russian Federation. Elevated to the rank of dogma, the "anti-Americanism" promoted in the media has made Chinese policy, when compared to those of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s administrations, less and less pragmatic. It has become an ideological hostage of Beijing’s centralisation of power. And the key answer to the questions of how to interpret China's words and deeds, in the context of Russia's war in Ukraine, lies precisely in the processes taking place inside the Middle Kingdom.
After the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017, on the basis of the anti-corruption campaign, this centralisation of power began in earnest. These processes gained further momentum after the last party congress in 2022. Xi Jinping was not looking for partners in the international arena who would show him democratic solutions, but rather those who would help him cement his dominant position inside China. Here Putin turned out to be the best candidate to assist Xi in achieving this goal.
For more than a decade, Xi Jinping has invested considerable political capital in interpersonal relations, and thanks to this he has achieved, among other things, a degree of power that even Mao Zedong would envy. But just as Mao Zedong has become a hostage to relations with Stalin, now Xi has become a hostage to his relations with Putin. In order to maintain a superior position inside China, Xi Jinping has no choice but to support Putin. Mao supported Stalin even after his death, because he knew that without doing so, someone else would take over the reins of the Chinese Communist Party.
There are an increasing number of voices pointing to the military cooperation between China and Russia. This would indicate that the "hawks" have prevailed in the internal decision-making circles, resulting in even more assertive actions. However, this is not about a major action, i.e. the military capture of the "rebellious province" – Taiwan. In the short term, this has been illustrated by the situation involving a "spy balloon" in US airspace, which torpedoed the visit of Antony Blinken – the American Secretary of State, to Beijing and dashed the hopes of a "controlled" thaw in US-Chinese relations.
China's alternative to the Western world, an "active defence"
The last event that caught the attention of the international community was a published document specifying the Global Security Initiative (GSI) presented by Xi Jinping at the UN and the 12 points of the "Chinese position on a political solution to the Ukrainian crisis".
The first document was addressed mainly to the developing countries, as a kind of an alternative to the Western world. It is a declarative list of a number of initiatives, such as cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and regional formats such as China-ASEAN. The United Nations was not left out either. This international order is to be based on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
With regard to the 12 points presented by China regarding the Ukrainian crisis, it must be said that this an example of the aforementioned "indirect" culture. In addition, the Chinese authorities do like listing, because it gives the impression that what is being presented is countable, concrete and therefore true. Furthermore, it must be said that the submitted document is a collection of Chinese demands that have been repeated over the past year and is therefore nothing new. However, the context of this proposal is important, as it was published on the anniversary of Moscow's attack on Kiev, as well as against the backdrop of "The Wall Street Journal’s" article about Secretary Blinken’s concerns that China may supply Russia with weapons.
Thus, the document promoting the GSI, and these 12 points is an "active defence", with China wanting to present itself as a neutral country that negotiates and mediates. However, the centralisation of power in the Middle Kingdom and the fact of a "borderless partnership " with the Russian Federation naturally contradict this.
Text: Dr hab. Dominik Mierzejewski, Associate Professor
Edit: Marcin Kowalczyk, Communications and PR Centre, University of Lodz
Photo: Bartosz Kałużny, Communications and PR Centre, University of Lodz
The mission of the University of Lodz is to conduct reliable research and actively disseminate facts and research results so as to wisely educate future generations, be useful to society and courageously respond to the challenges of the modern world. Scientific excellence is always our best compass. Our values include: courage, curiosity, commitment, cooperation and respect.